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ABSTRACT
This article reviews two approaches to the implementation of neutral principles of law –
the constitutionally permissible method of resolving property disputes between bodies in a
religious hierarchy. Though both approaches may be valid, the formal title approach, as
implemented by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Presbytery of Beaver-Butler v. Middlesex
Presbyterian Church, leads to problems in application that have been rectified by that court’s
more recent decision in In re St. James the Less. It is the contention of this article that future
courts and practitioners facing church property disputes can draw guidance from the St. James
decision when faced any church property dispute to be resolved under neutral principles of law.
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Here Is the Church, Now Who Owns the Steeple?
A Revised Approach to Church Property Disputes
By: Adam E. Lyons1
In November of 2005, in response to the Episcopal church’s position on homosexuality, a
coalition of church members gathered in Pittsburgh to voice their intent to force a separation
from the hierarchy.2

Though the dispute was theological, the protest came with an

acknowledgement that it was likely to spill over into the practical, as dissenting parishes sought
not only to leave the church’s sacrament but also to take their parish buildings with them.3 The
protest could hardly have surprised the Episcopal church; it and many of the other mainline
American churches are embroiled in internal disputes stemming from disagreements on this issue
and others.4
Pennsylvania’s courts are intimately familiar with such disputes.

Just within the

Episcopal church, different groups have brought property disputes before the courts in
Philadelphia5 and Pittsburgh6 over the last few years. There is every reason to expect that similar
property disputes will come before the Pennsylvania courts again.
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When they do, they will be heard in light of an established conceptual framework. In
1978, the Supreme Court of the United States issued Jones v. Wolf7 in which it, for the first time,
specifically approved the constitutionality of the “neutral principles of law” approach for
resolving disputes regarding the ownership of church property. Since that time, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has issued two opinions applying neutral principles, Presbytery of BeaverButler v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church8 in 1985 and In re: St. James the Less9 in 2005.
Interestingly, while both decisions claim to apply the same neutral principles of law approach to
similar facts, they come to opposite results, in one case finding in favor of the local parish and in
the other in favor of the hierarchy. St. James asserts that this alternate holding is due to those
few facts that distinguish the earlier decision from the later, but close analysis reveals that
something else occurs. Examination of these cases and the precedents from which they stem
shows that Beaver-Butlersuffered from inherent failings that St. James rectified.
This article argues that with In re: St. James the Less, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
modified its prior statement on judicial oversight of ecclesiastical organizations. While the use
of neutral principles of law to resolve church property disputes remains the rule, the particular
method by which the court had applied that approach (the “formal title” method) is no longer
valid. Instead, courts are specifically instructed to review religious documents as part of their
neutral principles analysis and are to give such documents an unweighted reading when
determining whether a property interest exists.
Part one of this article provides an overview of the development of the neutral principles
of law approach, with a specific focus on those elements that are key to Beaver-Butler and St.
James. Part two reviews the Beaver-Butler decision and examines relevant elements of prior
7
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decisions, both those it relied on and those it ignored. Part three discusses St. James in light of
Beaver-Butler, highlighting some of the tensions in the earlier opinion that are addressed by St.
James. In part four, the article examines the guidance that future courts and practitioners facing
church property disputes should draw from St. James. Finally, the article reviews certain lessons
to be drawn from the change in Pennsylvania law, both for courts in Pennsylvania and those in
other jurisdictions.
I.

The United States Supreme Court Has Developed Guidelines for Resolving Church
Property Disputes.
The detailed history of civil court review of church property disputes is well-documented

elsewhere10 and is far beyond the scope of this article. A brief overview of that history, however,
is necessary for understanding the context in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued
Beaver-Butler and St. James.
In Watson v. Jones, the United States Supreme Court held that in property disputes
between a parish11 and the hierarchy with which it affiliates, civil courts must defer to and
enforce the decisions of that hierarchy.12 In no small part, the Court based this ruling on the
simple logic that civil courts could not be proficient adjudicators of ecclesiastical disputes,13 a
position which, as the Court noted, was also taken by a number of state supreme courts,
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including the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.14 This approach, which has become alternatively
known as the “deference” or “polity”15 approach, was not limited to a property dispute per se,
but instead was the only permissible approach for dealing with any ecclesiastical dispute brought
before a civil court.16 In effect, this rule created a pro-hierarchy bias because every such dispute
involves a hierarchy that believes it is right.
Subsequent to Watson, federal courts resolved church property disputes pursuant to the
deference approach, though a few decisions suggested that alternate approaches could be
permitted.17 Of note among these is Maryland and Virginia Eldership of Churches of God v.
Sharpsburg Church, in which Justice Brennan, in concurrence, stated that “[n]eutral principles of
law, developed for use in all property disputes, provide another means for resolving litigation
over religious property. Under the ‘formal title’ doctrine, civil courts can determine ownership
by studying deeds, reverter clauses, and general state corporation laws.”18 This “formal title”
approach would have resolved church property disputes according to the exclusively civil law

14
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documents pertaining to the property in question. That, however, was not the approach that the
Court adopted with its 1979 decision in Jones v. Wolf. 19
In Jones, the Court faced a property dispute regarding which of two factions in a parish
had the right to the parish’s property when the smaller faction was loyal to the hierarchy to
which the parish belonged and the larger faction was not.20

Writing for the five-member

majority, Justice Blackmun first held that, subject to certain constitutional limitations (most
importantly, the requirement that the civil courts not resolve church property disputes on the
basis of religious doctrine),
the First Amendment does not dictate that a State must follow a
particular method of resolving church property disputes. Indeed,
“a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling
church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of
doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the
tenets of faith.”21
The Court further held that one of these permitted approaches was the application of “neutral
principles of law.”22
The Court reasoned that neutral principles of law “promises to free civil courts
completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.”23 To
resolve these church property disputes, a court will look at deeds, state statutes, and relevant
“religious documents” (specifically including, in Jones, the “Book of Church Order”) and
“scrutinize the document[s] in purely secular terms.”24 When examining “religious documents,”
however, the “civil court must take special care to scrutinize the document in purely secular
terms, and not to rely on religious precepts,” especially where the
19
20
21
22
23
24
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deed, the corporate charter, or the constitution of the general
church incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating to
the ownership of property. If in such a case the interpretation of
the instruments of ownership would require the civil court to
resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to the
resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical
body.25
Thus, the Jones court approved an approach under which religious documents are viewed for
their civil significance unless they are so instilled with religious meaning as to make civil court
review impossible.
The Court also addressed the fear that a new rule would change the status quo between
parishes and hierarchies where both had long understood any property stayed with the hierarchy.
To alleviate that fear, the Court specifically stated that the parties could remove any doubt about
the intent to create a trust by placing language stating their intent in the deeds, parish’s charter,
or hierarchy’s constitution.26 The change from Watson to Jones was not intended to change the
ownership of property, but simply to remove the pro-hierarchy bias from that consideration.
Instead, the Court gave both parties’ views equal weight so as to create an unbiased review.
The four Justices in dissent, lead by Justice Powell, believed the majority went too far in
requiring a court to engage in a document review to define the parties’ agreement. On the
contrary, the dissent concurred with the Watson court’s reasoning that the parties’ agreement to a
form of hierarchical government was all the evidence that the court could or should review.27 By
instead requiring a probing review into church documents, but limited to those documents
evidencing secular intent to create a trust, the majority “ensures that in some cases the courts will

25
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impose a form of church government and a doctrinal resolution at odds with that reached by the
church's own authority.”28
Though Watson and Jones employ different approaches, both seek the same result: to
enforce the will of the parties as expressed in the contract between them. Thus, the Watson
deference approach allowed that “[i]ndividuals or groups may affiliate themselves for religious
purposes with any other individuals or groups they choose – apparently on any terms – without
interference form the courts.”29 The Jones neutral principles approach – “a restrictive rule of
evidence,” as Justice Powell termed it30 – applied a different standard and looked at different
evidence, but to the same purpose: to enforce the parties’ contract.31 For that reason, Jones
specifically allowed for a single statement of trust in the hierarchy’s documents to be
determinative. The rule after Jones appears to be that, so long as the terms of the contract
between the parties can be discerned, it is to be enforced by the courts.
II.

Pennsylvania Has Adopted Neutral Principles of Law as the Exclusive Approach for
Resolving Church Property Disputes.
Even prior to Jones, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had suggested that it would apply

neutral principles to resolve church property disputes. In Western Pennsylvania Conference of
United Methodist Church v. Everson Evangelical Church the court addressed a church property
dispute within a hierarchical denomination, wherein two parishes sought to withdraw from the
hierarchy with which they were affiliated.32 In both parishes, title to the property favored the
parish.33 The parishes, however, admitted that they “subscribed to the doctrine and were subject

28
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to the jurisdictional control of” the hierarchy and “that the Book of Discipline of the said United
Methodist Church provides that the parent denomination governs all matters relating to the use of
property held by its member churches.”34
The Everson court first acknowledged that Pennsylvania law required that any parish that
separated itself from its hierarchy must forfeit the property it held.35 Nonetheless, the court said
that it was applying “neutral principles of law” to resolve the case, under which approach it
placed the property with the denomination according to the hierarchy’s Book of Discipline “a
contractual agreement between the parent denomination and its members”.36 Because Everson
acknowledged both deference and neutral principles, it left unclear exactly what law
Pennsylvania courts should apply. The opinion, however, did clearly establish the elements of a
neutral principles approach. First, under neutral principles, courts should settle church property
disputes according to the intent of the parties, as expressed in their denominational documents.
Second, these denominational documents were to be construed as a contract. Third, if that
contract gave the hierarchy control over the use of the property, then that contract would be
enforced.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court next dealt with a church property dispute in Presbytery
of Beaver-Butler v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church,37 its first decision relating to church
property after Jones. The case involved a parish that had been part of the United Presbyterian
Church in the United States of America (a hierarchical body) and its predecessor since 1799.38
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The parish had split into two competing groups, the larger of which sought to leave the hierarchy
and retain the parish property.39
The evidence before the court did not lead to any obvious conclusion. Title to the
property was in the parish’s name.40 There was no explicit trust language in the hierarchy’s
documents (in fact, the dispute arose just prior to the inclusion of such language).41 The parish’s
charter, however, provided that its purpose is “to worship according to the faith, doctrine, creed,
discipline and usages of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.”42 Also
supporting the pro-hierarchy group’s claim to the property were several passages from the
hierarchy’s Book of Order, which gave the hierarchy authority over sale and use of the property
as well as a right to the property in case of parish dissolution.43 The trial court granted summary
judgment awarding the property to the parish.44
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed this decision, first ruling that the
property should remain with the hierarchy under the deference approach and then finding that the
same result would occur were neutral principles applied.45 In its neutral principles analysis, the

39
40
41
42
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471 A.2d at 1272.
Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1280 n.3
Id. at 1272.
[i]n the case of a formal dissolution or extinction of a particular [parish], its
properties shall be held, used and applied to such uses as the [hierarchy] should
direct …. The particular [parish] may not sell, mortgage, encumber, or lease real
property without permission of the [hierarchy] …. The [hierarchy] … may
determine that the … particular [parish] is unable or unwilling to manage wisely
the affairs of its church and appoint an Administrative Commission to take
charge of the particular [parish]…. [The hierarchy] has “exclusive authority
over the uses to which the [parish] buildings and properties may be put” and to
delegate this responsibility to the trustees of the adjunct nonprofit corporation
subject to the “superior authority and direction of the [hierarchy].” … Finally,
trustees, the name given the officers of the nonprofit corporation holding title to
[parish] property “shall deal with such property only as they may be authorized
or directed by the [hierarchy].”

Id. at 1281 (citations omitted).
489 A.2d at 1319.
45
471 A.2d at 1274, 1279.
44
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commonwealth court relied on the noted provisions of the Book of Order, combined with the
statement of purpose in the parish charter and the effect of a Pennsylvania statute under which
“control of local congregations over property is subject to the regulations and requirements of the
denomination of which it is a part,”46 as demonstrating that the parish had intended to bind its
property to the hierarchy under neutral principles of law.47
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned these conclusions. First, it determined that
it would exclusively apply neutral principles of law, as it found had been acknowledged in
Presbyterian Church and Sharpsburg and approved in Jones, to church property disputes.48 The
court then determined that only the parish could be the settlor of any property interest because
the parish “was not a creation or offshoot of the central denomination,” “all property was
retained in the corporate name of the parish,” and “there was never any express trust language in
the [hierarchy’s] constitution during the entire period [the parish] remained affiliated.”49
Because the parish was the settlor, it was the parish’s intent that was relevant.
Despite the apparent similarity to the evidence in Everson (a comparison not
acknowledged in Beaver-Butler), the court found that the Beaver-Butler parish had not shown
any intent to place a property interest with the hierarchy. This conclusion was based on two
premises: first, the parish had retained the property in its own name, and second, the Book of
Order was intended “as a means of overseeing the spiritual development of member churches”
and was therefore not evidence of an intent to place the property with the hierarchy.50 The court

46

10 P.S. § 81.
471 A.2d 1279-81.
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also noted, in dicta, that the provisions in the Book of Order were “far from constituting the clear
unequivocal evidence necessary to support a conclusion that a trust existed.”51
These findings are inherently problematic and confuse any application of neutral
principles. First, the court justified its ruling on the fact that the parish had kept title to the
property in its own name.52

If, however, the name in which the property is titled were

conclusive, then there would never be an analysis of the charters and religious documents to see
if those documents show the necessary intent to create a trust, as neutral principles contemplates.
While the fact that the property is not titled to the hierarchy is a necessary before the court could
consider if the parties showed the intent to create a property interest, it is not the end of the
analysis under neutral principles. 53 Yet, perhaps with the intent of adopting Justice Brennan’s
“formal title” approach from Sharpsburg, the Beaver-Butler decision treats this prerequisite as a
conclusion.
Second, the conclusion to ignore the Book of Order, because it was “spiritual” in nature
and could not be evidence of the intent to create a trust, is equally problematic.54 The reported
decision does not explain the reasons for the finding that the Book of Order is exclusively
“spiritual,” but a review of the Beaver-Butler defendants’ filings for summary judgment is
illuminating.

In their motion for summary judgment, the Beaver-Butler defendants had

specifically argued that the “Book of Order provides that the governing bodies of UPCUSA
possess only ecclesiastical power and ecclesiastical jurisdiction,” and in support of that

51

Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1325.
53
This is not to say that the fact that the property is titled to the parish is not evidence of the parish’s intent not to
create a trust, which of course it is, as the clearest intent to create a trust would be a direct statement in the deed that
a trust exists.
54
489 A.2d at 1325.
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argument they quoted portions of the document.55 It is odd, however, that the court accepted the
“spiritual” interpretation out of hand, with no discussion in the opinion, especially because the
Book of Order language does not appear necessarily to lead to that interpretation and because, as
religious documents, the language may have meanings not readily apparent to layperson.56
But even if the finding that the document is “spiritual” were correct, the very premise of
neutral principles as stated in Jones is that the court considers religious documents for their civil
impact.57 If the document reviewed was so “spiritual” in nature that the court could not interpret
it without relying on “religious precepts,” then the court “must defer to the resolution of the
doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body.”58 In Beaver-Butler, that would mean
that if interpretation of the Book of Order was made impossible by its religious intent, then the

55

Mot. for Summ. J., filed in Presbytery of Beaver-Butler of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of
America v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church, Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Pennsylvania, Eq. No. 81-024
Book 23 Page 241, filed Feb. 19, 1982, at 5-6 (emphasis in original). The full quotations are as follows:
Since ecclesiastical discipline must be purely moral or spiritual in its object, and
not attended with any civil effects, it can derive no force whatever but from its
own justice, the approbation of an impartial public, and the countenance and
blessing of the great Head of the Church Universal.
Id. at 5 (quoting Book of Order ¶ 31.08 (1980-81).
These judicatories ought not to possess any civil jurisdiction, or to
impose any civil penalties. Their power is wholly moral or spiritual, and that
only ministerial and declarative. They possess the right of requiring obedience
to the laws of Christ and of excluding the disobedient and disorderly from the
privileges of the Church. To give efficiency, however to this necessary and
Scriptural authority, they possess the powers requisite for obtaining evidence
and inflicting order and government of the Church; they can require members of
their own society to appear and give testimony in the cause; but the highest
punishment to which their authority extends is to exclude the contumacious and
impenitent from the congregation of believers.
Id. at 6 (quoting Book of Order ¶ 35.05 (1980-81)) (emphasis added). “The functions of the Church as a Kingdom
and government distinct form the civil commonwealth are to proclaim, to administer, and to enforce the law of
Christ revealed in the Scriptures.” Id. (quoting Book of Order ¶ 35.08 (1980-81) (emphasis added).
56
See generally Sirico, supra note 10, at 33 (arguing that civil events may have religious implications: “a religious
question is arguably involved – whether a church that withdraws from a general church ceases to exist. From the
general church’s viewpoint, apostasy might be the equivalent of nonexistence.”).
57
Jones, 443 U.S. at 604 (the court must consider “religious documents” and “scrutinize the document[s] in purely
secular terms”).
58
Id.. at 604 (citation omitted).
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court should have deferred to the hierarchy’s determination that the document was intended to
create a trust.
Without these two conclusions, the Beaver-Butler decision would only stand on the
court’s final reason, given as dicta, that the provisions of the Book of Order were insufficient to
show the intent to create a trust.59 The asserted insufficiency of the evidence might be an
appropriate ground for the holding (though one that was belied by the similarity to Everson), but
it was not the one on which the court relied.
III.

In re: St. James the Less Claims Continuity with Beaver-Butler, but Demonstrates
Difference.
After Beaver-Butler, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not again address church

property disputes until In re: St. James the Less, a dispute between a parish and the hierarchy of
which it was a member, the Episcopal Church.60 In 1999, as the result of long-standing doctrinal
differences between the parish and the hierarchy, the parish attempted to disaffiliate while
retaining its property, through the mechanism of merging into a previously-established
corporation that had no relationship to the hierarchy.61
The evidence in St. James bore a striking similarity to that in Beaver-Butler. Title to the
property was in the parish’s name,62 but from 1967 until the attempted merger, the parish’s
charter had provided that the purpose of the corporation was “the support of the public worship
of Almighty God according to the faith and discipline of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the

59

489 A.2d at 1325.
In re: Church of St. James the Less, No. 47 E. D. Appeal Docket 2004, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 3116, at *1 - *2 (Pa.
Dec. 29, 2005). The opinion is officially reported at 888 A.2d 795, but as of the time of this printing, official page
numbers had not been assigned.
61
In re: Church of St. James the Less, No. 47 E.D. Appeal Docket 2004, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 3116, at *10 (Pa. Dec. 29,
2005).
62
833 A.2d at 322.
60
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United States of America and the Diocese of Pennsylvania.”63, 64 Also like in Beaver-Butler (and
Everson, for that matter), in St. James the hierarchy’s documents gave the hierarchy authority
over the disposition and use of the property.65
The charter and the hierarchical documents in St. James each had a significant difference
from Beaver-Butler, however, most particularly in the explicit statement of trust in the
hierarchy’s documents via the 1979 Dennis Canon.66 In addition, the parish charter “excludes
from membership any ‘person who shall disclaim or refuse conformity with and obedience to the
constitution, canons, doctrines, discipline or worship of the Protestant Episcopal Church or of the
Diocese ....’” and prohibited the parish from amending the charter without diocesan approval.67
The trial court determined that 10 P.S. § 81 (the same statute on which the
Commonwealth Court had relied in Beaver-Butler)68 required the parish’s charter to incorporate
all hierarchical rules regarding property and, pursuant to those rules, that the hierarchy was the
holder and trustee of the property.69
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s decision and ruled that the
Dennis Canon alone demonstrates the existence of the trust.70 As part of this decision, the
appellate court focused on a factor that distinguished St. James from Beaver-Butler: that St.
63

Id. at 323 (citation omitted). In the Episcopal Church hierarchy, dioceses are intermediary jurisdictions, superior
to parishes, but beneath the church as a whole.
64
The charter also provided that the parish “‘accedes to, recognizes and adopts the constitution, canons doctrines,
discipline and worship’” of the Protestant Episcopal Church and the Diocese. Id. Presumably because of the
similarity of this provision to the purpose statement, the court did not deem it necessary to individually address this
provision.
65
Id. at 325 n.5.
66
The Dennis Canon, which the Episcopal church adopted in response to the invitation in Jones v. Wolf, states that
“[a]ll real and personal property held by or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission or Congregation is held in trust for
this Church and the Diocese thereof in which such Parish, Mission or Congregation is located.” Id. at 322 n.2
(citation omitted). The Diocese had also enacted explicit trust language, in 1941, stating that parish property is held
“for the work of the Diocese.” In re: Church of St. James the Less, No. 47 E.D. Appeal Docket 2004, 2005 Pa.
LEXIS 3116, at *38 (Pa. Dec. 29, 2005).
67
833 A.2d at 323 (citations omitted; ellipses in original).
68
471 A.2d 1279-81.
69
833 A.2d at 321-22.
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James had remained part of the hierarchy after the Dennis Canon was adopted, whereas the
parish in Beaver-Butler had not.71 The court, however, also made clear that St. James would not
have avoided the trust interest had it left the hierarchy prior to the Dennis Canon. On the
contrary, the court found that there were preexisting evidences of a trust72 – even though, with
regard to several of these other proofs, “[s]imilar language quoted from the Book of Order in
Presbytery of Beaver-Butler was held to refer only to matters of spiritual development and not to
evidence intent to create a trust”.73
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower courts’ determination that there
was a trust, but on different grounds.74 Like the commonwealth court, the supreme court found
that the Dennis Canon created a trust.75 The larger part of the decision, however, asked whether
the parish had intended to establish a trust interest in its property such that the interest shown by
Dennis Canon was not forced upon it. The supreme court found that the parish had such intent:
St. James’ Charter declares that St. James’ purpose is to serve as a
place to worship God “according to the faith and discipline of the
[National Episcopal Church].” More importantly, the Charter
ensures that St. James will always be used for this purpose as it (1)
states that any person who disclaims the authority of the National
Episcopal Church or the Diocese can no longer be a member of St.
James; and (2) requires St. James to obtain the Diocese's consent
for amendments to its Charter. Accordingly, St. James effectively
agreed in these provisions to always accede to the authority of the
National Episcopal Church and the Diocese and to forever serve as
a place of worship for those who adhere to that same authority.76
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Id .at 324.
Id. at 324-25.
72
Id. at 325.
73
Id. at 323.
74
The Supreme Court did not affirm the lower court’s finding that the hierarchy was the title holder and trustee,
however, instead finding that the title holder and trustee was the parish. In re: Church of St. James the Less, No. 47
E.D. Appeal Docket 2004, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 3116, at *41-*42 (Pa. Dec. 29, 2005).
75
Id. *40.
76
Id. at *36-37 (citations and footnote omitted; insertion in original).
71
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The court also found relevant, though not necessary to the decision, that St. James amended its
charter (and accepted the rules then in effect) after the Diocese had added its 1941 canon
requiring the parish to “to take and hold its property ‘for the work of the [Diocese],’” and that the
hierarchy’s rules required the parish “not to alienate or encumber its property without the
Diocese's consent,” and that “if [the parish] ever dissolves, its property will be placed in trust for
the Diocese.”77
It is particularly of note that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that these provisions
supported the intent to create a trust while admitting that they were “similar” to the provisions
that Beaver-Butler said did not.78 Indeed, this very similarity was evoked by the St. James
defendants as part of their argument against finding a trust.79 The court, however, ruled that “the
provisions in the instant case are distinguishable from those in Beaver-Butler primarily because
they require St. James to always accede to the authority of the” hierarchy and because the
Beaver-Butler provisions did not prohibit disaffiliation.80
Writing in dissent, Justice Newman pointed out several perceived problems in the
majority opinion. First, she found that several points of Pennsylvania trust law made it difficult
for the hierarchy to show the existence of a trust in St. James, specifically because the law placed
a high burden of proof on the hierarchy to show a trust and made several technical requirements
that were not fulfilled under the facts of St. James.81 Second, Justice Newman assailed the
majority’s reliance on documents that “fail even to mention the res of the supposed trust” and
therefore cannot show “St. James intended by including the language in its Charter to create a

77
78
79
80
81

Id. at *39.
Id.
Id. at *39 n.29.
Id.
Id. at *46-*53 (Newman, J., concurring).
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trust.”82 Finally, Justice Newman attacked the remaining points the majority claims as additional
evidence of the intent to create a trust, on the basis that materially identical language was held
insufficient in Beaver-Butler.83
Justice Newman’s points are not invalid, but equally they do not undermine the St. James
decision. Instead, they highlight the several ways in which In re: St. James the Less revised the
state of the law after Beaver-Butler, without expressly overturning with the prior opinion.
IV.

The Differing Conclusion in St. James than that in Beaver-Butler Signifies Two
Changes in Pennsylvania Law Regarding Church Property Disputes.
In distinguishing itself from Beaver-Butler solely on the basis of the unbreakable bond

between the parish and the hierarchy, while choosing not to address the two reasons the BeaverButler court gave in support of its decision (i.e., that the deeds did not include explicit trust
language and that the document containing the relevant language was “spiritual”), despite the
similarities that implicate these other reasons, the St. James court has indicated a move away
from the principles in the earlier decision and placed itself on more firm constitutional ground.
The intended larger effect of St. James can be seen, in part, by its going beyond the issues
absolutely necessary to its result. Having established that the parish charter prohibited anyone
who disclaimed the hierarchy’s authority from having any membership in the parish, the court
could have simply ruled that it was “unscrambling the omelet” created by the parish’s attempted
departure: if anyone who disclaimed authority was no longer a member empowered to take acts
for the parish and if attempting to leave the hierarchy was an act that disclaimed authority, then it
would be impossible for the parish to effect any action that would cause the parish property to
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Id. at *53-*54 (Newman, J., concurring).
Id. at *47-*51 (Newman, J., concurring).
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leave the hierarchy.84 Instead of making this its ultimate conclusion, however, the court treated
this holding as a step toward justifying the property interest. The implication is that the court felt
it had to clarify the principles it addressed in that additional discussion (i.e. regarding neutral
principles) and was not merely confirming established ideas.
For that matter, treating St .James as merely confirming Beaver-Butler would be odd in
that there was no need to reconfirm Beaver-Butler at all. The decision remained good law at the
time of St. James and the court’s decision in St. James did not change the lower courts’ finding
of a trust. Had the court merely wished to modify an aspect of the lower courts’ opinions (e.g.,
by changing the trustee from the parish to the hierarchy) it could have limited its opinion to that
point. There is no justification for the length and breadth of opinion that was produced unless it
is understood as clarifying mistakes made by Beaver-Butler.
Justice Newman’s dissent also helps illustrate that St. James did not seek to simply
confirm the Beaver-Butler approach. Her points regarding general trust law and unaddressed
similarities between Beaver-Butler and St. James85 are apt, but they do not undermine the
ultimate conclusion in St. James if the unnecessary assumption that St. James merely sought to
reconfirm Beaver-Butler is removed. When viewed from the perspective that the St. James court
was not trying to support Beaver-Butler, t he issues upon which Justice Newman focuses merely
serve to highlight a change in the law.
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For that matter, the trial court and appellate courts had found that the parish’s attempted merger was void for
failure to obtain both court and hierarchy approval. Id. at *13, *19 n.20. Court approval, in particular, was required
under a provision of the Pennsylvania Corporate Code (15 Pa. C.S. § 5547) that prohibited any change in corporate
purpose without such. Thus, simply continuing to apply the secular code would have allowed the court an “out” that
did not require any analysis of an implied trust under neutral principles. In fact the lower court’s decisions on this
point had not been presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for review, id.. at *13, and the court could simply
have ruled that an opinion on whether there was a trust was unnecessary because the attempted merger was undone
in any event.
85
Id. at *46-*54 (Newman, J., concurring).
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If one reviews the St. James decision not just for its holding, but for what it actually
relied on, says, and does not say, it becomes clear that the St. James court did far more than
simply resolve the case before it. Instead it rectified two errors in Pennsylvania law regarding
church property disputes.
A.

St. James Clarifies that a Court Must Review All Available Evidence and
that Exclusion of the “Spiritual” Is Prohibited.

By acknowledging but then ignoring the Beaver-Butler court’s refusal to review a
“spiritual” document for its civil effect and by refocusing the inquiry on the standards from
Jones (which undermine the Beaver-Butler approach), the St. James court has shown the BeaverButlerview of neutral principles is no longer valid law.
That St. James has dismissed Beaver-Butler’s review of documents to determine if they
are “spiritual” is established at several points in the decision. In no small part, that change is
shown in St. James’s choice not to substantively address Beaver-Butler’s reliance on the
“spiritual” finding, despite acknowledging that this issue was present in the prior decision.86 It is
no answer to say that the question did not come up in St. James: on the contrary, the parish
raised the issue87 and the court specifically found that provisions “similar” to those ignored as
coming from a “spiritual” source in Beaver-Butler were relevant to the case before it.88 If the
question of “spirituality” continued to matter, one would expect that the St. James court would
have stated at least that the hierarchy’s documents were not “spiritual” under the facts before it;
instead, it did not even address that question.89 For that matter, Justice Newman also ignored the

86

Compare id. at *31 n.26 (restating that Beaver-Butler found not intent to create a trust from the Book of Order
because that document focused on “spiritual development”) with id. at *39 n.29 (distinguishing Beaver-Butler
without examining whether the hierarchy’s documents focused on spiritual development).
87
Id. at *39 n.29.
88
A conclusion which the appellate court reached and highlight for the supreme court’s consideration. 833 A.2d at
323.
89
In re: Church of St. James the Less, No. 47 E.D. Appeal Docket 2004, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 3116, at *38 (Pa. Dec. 29,
2005).
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“spiritual” issue, focusing instead on the prior court’s finding that the similar evidence was
insufficient proof.90 Thus, neither majority nor minority saw fit to address this key element of
the prior court’s decision, a clear indication that neither believed that theory had continued
viability.
The movement away from Beaver-Butlercan also be seen in the St. James court’s return
to Jones rather than Beaver-Butlerfor its statement of the relevant standards.

91

To that end, the

St. James court restated the principle in Jones as follows: “the Court directed civil courts to
scrutinize documents evincing the parties’ intentions, such as a church charter or constitution, ‘in
purely secular terms, and not rely on religious precepts in determining whether the document
indicates that the parties have intended to create a trust’”92 and required the courts to review the
“‘terms of a governing statute, the property deed, and any other document that expresses the
parties’ intentions regarding the ownership of the property.’”93

In contrast, Beaver-Butler

contains only one quotation from Jones and that sole reference contains none of this language,
instead focusing on the idea that neutral principles will “free civil courts completely from
entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.”94 When it refused to
review the hierarchy’s documents as too “spiritual,” Beaver-Butler may have been focusing on
this quotation and thereby violated key elements of Jones. By returning to Jones, St. James reestablished the proper standards for review.
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Id. at *42-*56.
In regard to which, it is notable that Jones specifically included the “Book of Church Order” in its discussion of
documents that were to be considered under neutral principles.
92
In re: Church of St. James the Less, No. 47 E.D. Appeal Docket 2004, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 3116, at *26 n.24 (Pa.
Dec. 29, 2005) (quoting Jones, 443 U.S. at 604).
93
Id. at *25 (quoting Jones, 443 U.S. at 603).
94
507 Pa. at 263.
91
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B.

After St. James, Civil Courts Are to View the Evidence in Church Property
Disputes as a Contract and Interpret It Without Bias in Favor of Either
Party.

A second principle to draw from St. James is that evidence should be read without bias to
accurately determine the parties’ intent. That was the approach in Everson, where the court
found a trust under neutral principles. There, the evidence was that the parish’s charter aligned
the parish with the hierarchy and that the hierarchy’s rules gave the hierarchy authority over the
disposition and use of the property.95 In Beaver-Butler the evidence was nearly identical, but the
result was different, creating a clear conflict.96 By evaluating the evidence as it did in St. James,
the court resolved the conflict between Everson and Beaver-Butler in favor of the Everson
court’s balanced reading of the evidence.
In St. James the evidence was very similar to that in Everson and Beaver-Butler: the
parish had adopted a statement of purpose that aligned it with the hierarchy and the hierarchy had
adopted rules that gave it authority over the disposition and use of the property. To be fair, there
were also differences between the evidence in St. James and that in the two earlier cases, but
after recognizing these differences the supreme court maintained that it could rely on the
“similar” evidence as well in support of its opinion.97 The commonwealth court also noted that
the evidence it relied upon was similar to that found insufficient in Beaver-Butler. 98 Thus, both
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Commonwealth Court found that evidence previously
dismissed in a church property dispute was now relevant and probative.
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471 A.2d at 1280.
The Beaver-Butler court does point out that the evidence of the hierarchy’s control over property issues in
Everson was uncontested, 489 A.2d at 1322-23, but the differing conclusion in Beaver-Butler was the result of the
weighting of this evidence and not a dispute over its existence.
97
In re: Church of St. James the Less, No. 47 E.D. Appeal Docket 2004, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 3116, at *36-*37 (Pa.
Dec. 29, 2005).
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833 A.2d at 323, 325 n.5.
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The clear similarity of the evidence in all three cases prohibits resolving a church
property dispute according to either of the earlier cases without considering the effect of St.
James. Instead, the only conclusion to draw from the double reverse in the court’s reading of
this evidence is that the Beaver-Butler reading is not correct. It is not credible to believe that
Beaver-Butler remains viable under any factual distinction between the three cases for two
reasons. First, the facts in the three cases are too similar and the results are too divergent to
accept the attempt to harmonize them by pointing to the minor differences. Instead, the only
reasonable way to account for the changing outcome is by recognizing the changed standard.
Second, St. James had reason to reform the Beaver-Butler view:

the earlier decision was

inconsistent with Jones in that it ignored evidence of the parties’ intentions. It did this not only
explicitly, when it excluded one’s party’s statement of intention by refusing to assess the
hierarchy’s documents because they were “spiritual,” but also implicitly when it undervalued the
hierarchy’s view (that is, it created a pro-parish bias), by finding that evidence, sufficient in
Everson, was now insufficient to show property interest.
Replacing the Watson court’s pro-hierarchy bias with a pro-parish bias was not the
intended effect of Jones. Rather, by giving each party equal power, Jones signaled a move to an
unbiased review. It was for that reason that the Court could state that the new approach would
not alter the outcome of a case where the parties did not intend it to do so. Instead, each party
would be empowered to announce the parties’ intent and, once done, that announcement became
binding. Because Beaver-Butler violated this principle by undervaluing one party’s intent, St.
James returned to Jones.
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V.

Conclusion.

As this article argues, In re: St. James the Less restores Pennsylvania law to the path it
had attained in the Everson decision, but from which it detoured with Beaver-Butler. Of course,
the court has done so without explicitly overturning Beaver-Butler, but neither did Beaver-Butler
explicitly overturn Everson; it simply rendered the prior decision superfluous by inserting the
“spiritual” question into the approach. In re-evaluating Beaver-Butler, the St. James court has
restored the neutral principles approach to the focus suggested in Jones and applied in Everson,
the search for the parties’ actual intent.
In both Watson and Jones the Supreme Court sought to define the appropriate scope of
review for a civil court examining a church property dispute – to determine how far into the
temple Caesar could appropriately go. Both Courts found that it was appropriate for a court to
enforce that to which the parties had agreed.

Where the courts disagreed was only in

determining what evidence to consider in order to establish that agreement: Watson looked for
evidence that the parish agreed to bind itself to the hierarchy, while Jones looked for evidence
that the parish and hierarchy had agreed to hierarchical property control. The Watson approach
created a de facto pro-hierarchy bias in its result (because a dispute always includes a hierarchy
that believes it is right), but under both cases, the idea of civil court intervention in a church
property dispute was to evaluate the appropriate evidence and generate a result consistent with
the parties’ intention.
Beaver-Butler moved away from this concept, instead focusing on only those statements
of intent that were available in strictly secular sources and undervaluing other sources even if
they were to be reviewed, perhaps in an unstated reliance on the “formal title” approach to
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neutral principles that Justice Brennan suggested in his Sharpsburg concurrence.99 It did this
despite the guidance in Jones to the contrary and despite its more broad view of the evidence in
Everson. Moreover, it did this even though formal title is not the majority position100 and is of
uncertain constitutionality – Justice Brennan would have allowed it, but the Jones court approved
a far less restrictive approach only by the slightest of majorities.
By re-evaluating Beaver-Butler, St. James has turned away from the formal title approach
and returned Pennsylvania law to the view Jones espoused. Thus, future Pennsylvania courts
reviewing church property disputes are to consider all evidence and not to avoid secular review
of the “spiritual.” Moreover, the courts must determine the parties’ intent without weighting the
evidence toward any particular result. Thus, In re: St. James the Less returns Pennsylvania law
to an accepted and workable approach to resolution of church property disputes.
The counter argument, that St. James and Beaver-Butler present a consistent approach,
falls in light of Everson. It is impossible to square Everson and Beaver-Butler after St. James:
once the “spiritual” argument is removed from Beaver-Butler, the fac ts in that case mirror those
in Everson such that either Beaver-Butler must overturn Everson or Beaver-Butler itself must be
overturned as inconsistent with the prior opinion. At the same time, the St. James court’s
99

The Beaver-Butler court may also have relied on certain language in Justice Powell’s Jones dissent, see Sirico,
supra note 10, at 47 (“According to Justice Powell, the [neutral principles] rule acts as a restrictive rule of evidence
in that it limits courts to examining language written in secular legal property terms and forbids consideration of
other language that might speak to the allocation of authority within the church polity.”) (citing 443 U.S. at 612-14
(Powell, J., dissenting)), or a misreading of the language in Jones that “a State may adopt any one of various
approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters,
whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith,’” 443 U.S. at 602 (second emphasis added), putting
too much emphasis on the second clause of this statement. In any event, it is clear from the Beaver-Butler court’s
exclusion of the “spiritual” evidence and focus on the title deeds, that it did not apply neutral principles as broadly as
Jones stated.
100
See, e.g., Bishop & Diocese of Colorado v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 91 n.6 (Colo. 1986) (rejecting “formal title” label
for neutral principles analysis). See also generally, e.g., Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen v. Episcopal Church in the
Diocese, 620 A.2d 1280, 1293 (Conn. 1993) (considering hierarchy’s documents under neutral principles);
Bjorkman v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 759 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1988); Daniel v. Wray, 580 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2003) (same) Trustees of the Diocese v. Trinity Episcopal Church, 684 N.Y.S.2d 76, 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)
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reliance on evidence equal to that accepted in Everson cannot be squared with Beaver-Butler’s
rank dismissal of that same evidence if the intermediate decision remains good law. Instead, the
only conclusion is that there has been a change in the relevant law and that under the St. James
view of the neutral principles standard, all available evidence is to be given unbiased review to
determine the parties’ intent and that intent is to be enforced.
Looked at more broadly, Pennsylvania’s experience is instructive for other jurisdictions
that may consider institution of the formal title approach.

Under Everson, Pennsylvania’s

approach was consistent with that later suggested in Jones – a broad review of all available
evidence to determine both parties’ intent.

The switch in Beaver-Butler, however, all but

removed the hierarchy’s intent from the analysis and reached a conclusion that directly
contradicted the hierarchy’s view. Thus, the Beaver-Butler application created the very situation
about which Justice Powell warned: it imposed a form of governance at odds with that the
parties actual chose. That also would have occurred in St. James had the court continued in the
narrow view and is likely to occur in any other case using strict title as well: only the rarest
dispute will include a parish that has deliberately included in its own documents the views of a
hierarchy with which it disagrees. But the conclusion to draw from the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s move away from this approach is that ignoring one party’s intent is bad law and worse
policy. Instead, the better view is to select an approach that gives voice to each party’s intent.
With In re St. James the Less, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has returned to that approach.
This broad approach is more consistent with that presently employed in most jurisdictions
and is the one squarely approved in Jones as constitutional. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would chose to readopt it as it has with St. James.

(same); Parish of the Advent v. Protestant Episcopal Diocese, 688 N.E.2d 923 (Mass. 1997) (same); Episcopal
Diocese v. DeVine, 797 N.E.2d 916, 924 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (same).

25

